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ABSTRACT 
When California Governor George Deukmejian assumed office in 1983, the state had not 
added to its twelve prisons in eighteen years. During his two terms, Deukmejian oversaw 
the construction of eight prisons — a 67% increase in eight years. This paper attempts to 
locate the impetus of this prison boom by analyzing three siting struggles in southern 
California. It argues that past scholarship fails to account for the interaction between 
the state and sited communities. Specifically, state-centered research fails to account 
for the power of city officials while rural-centered research fails to account for systemic 
factors. Accordingly, this paper introduces the term Please in Your Back Yard (PIYBY) to 
examine where and why the state sited a prison and how they tried to convince the 
community to accept it. PIYBYism complements the existing Not in My Back Yardism 
(NIMBYism) and Please in My Back Yardism (PIMBYism). The paper analyzes the 
interaction between the three terms, revealing that ideological, not economic concerns, 
caused the California prison boom. The prison boom emerged from a tough-on-crime 
moment — one that was necessarily anti-black. The three siting battles support this 
conclusion because anti-blackness permeated every group’s rhetoric. This paper, then, 
challenges the subject’s prevailing scholarship: politics lies at the base of the prison 
system. Even if one accepts the economic link, the economy only mattered in that it 
exacerbated an ongoing political movement that attempted to reassert white supremacy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When California Governor George Deukmejian assumed office in 1983, the state had not added 
to its twelve existing prisons in eighteen years. In two terms, however, Deukmejian oversaw the 
construction of eight prisons  a 67% increase in eight years. This precipitous rise in prisons 
elicited a dilemma (Skel  1990). A  La  B d , a c ib  f  Ri e ide C  Desert 
Sun b e ed, Al  e e b d  a  i  beca e al  e e b d  i  agai  c i e. B  
al  b d  a  i  i  hei  eighb h d  (B d  1990). Thi  a e  a al e  he 
conflict from the perspectives of both the state and the sited community. For the first, this paper 
examines Please in Your Back Yardism (PIYBYism)  where and why the state sited a prison and 
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how they tried to convince the community to accept it. Commu i ie  eac ed  he a e  
PIYBYism in two ways: with Not in My Back Yardism (NIMBYism) or Please in My Back Yardism 
(PIMBYism). The former refers to a hyper-localized movement that opposes a change  in this 
case, prison construction. These movements clashed with pro-prison PIMBY coalitions. In this 
a , he a e  e e  a di c i  be ee  a e a d c i   di c e  he i  b  
driver and hurdles.  
These discussions arise from Californian siting battles in L.A., Riverside, and Imperial 
Counties. In each, I chose a local publication (The Los Angeles Times, The Desert Sun, and The 
Calexico Chronicle, respectively) and analyzed PIYBY attitudes and the clash between NIMBY and 
PIMBY coalitions.1 The method encourages a holistic analysis that considers both state and local 
concerns and, crucially, the interaction between them.  
Figure 1: Map of California counties in which major prison citing battles took 
place. Pins represent the locations of various publications. 
 
The case studies demonstrate that anti-black ideology directly spurred both PIYBYism and 
NIMBYism. Anti-blackness, then, drove and hindered the prison boom as it simultaneously led 
the state to explode the prison population while also ensuring that no community wanted to house 
the prisoners. Although economic desperation primarily motivated PIMBYism, its supporters, 
too, adopted anti-blackness. Instead of viewing the prison as a place of black escapees, they viewed 
them as symbols of law and order. Even though the groups disagreed with one another, anti-
blackness underpinned all three. 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Many scholars have explained the prison boom over the past decades. This paper qualifies and 
disputes their findings. The scholarship diverges into two main schools of thought: state demand 
 lif  he a e  ec   al de a d  lif  he al ec . The e a ache  a e 
incomplete because they ignore the interaction between the community and the state; they focus 
on rhetoric, not discourse. Only by coupling PIYBYism and PIMBY-and-NIMBYism can scholars 
understand the causes and hurdles of the prison boom. This section will explain both rural-
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Hollenbeck 
 
Volume 17 Issue 1 Spring 2020             54 
 
centered and state-centered economic approaches, show how they fall short, and offer a better-
suited ideological frame.  
Scholar John Eason approaches the boom from a rural demand perspective. He suggests that 
prison construction does not reflect an increase in prison populations, pointing out that, although 
Illinois and Georgia have the same number of prisoners, Georgia has twenty-seven more prisons. 
Eason argues that rural demand, not overcrowding, caused the prison boom. He contends that 
state-ce e ed e la a i  ea  ci  fficial  a  c d i  f l  lab  a d la d ccumbing 
 e libe al licie .  Ci  fficial , he a g e , c lled he i i g ce , f a i g i  
building as a function of local demand spurred by economic desperation. Multiracial 
communities, though, also demanded prisons, which Eason uses to challenge the narrative that 
only white communities demanded and received prisons to spur job growth. Hence, Eason 
separates prison construction and anti-blackness, arguing that prisons are not a legacy of 
environmental or structural racism; they reflect rural economic demand due to faltering 
economies (Eason 2017, 3, 7, 101 104). His rural-centered approach, however, downplays the 
e ic fac  a  la . A  D . A e B d  gge , Thi  li e a e ejec  he c al aci  
a d  he acial ca i ali  e  d ci g  he de a d f  i  i  he fi  lace  (B d  
2018, 1 4). I  he  d , hi  k di ega d  he c i  i e ac i  i h he a e. The 
three siting battles demonstrate that all counties featured powerful NIMBY coalitions, 
discrediting the narrative that rural demand accounts for the proliferation. In reality, rural 
demand only reacted to changes in the state. Only by understanding those changes can scholars 
accurately interpret the prison boom.  
Ruth Gilmore provides this perspective in Golden Gulag. She attributes the growth to carceral 
Keynesianism  a form of Keynesianism that pours state resources into prison construction to 
secure the economy. In the post-War era, the California economy relied on Department of Defense 
spending. The 1969 recession, however, led to a steady decline in military spending, which 
a aged Calif ia  ec  (Gil e 2007, 35). I  he e i g decade, childh d e  
increased by 25%, and farmers took 100,000 acres of land out of production yearly. Taxpayers 
e e ed hei  di c e  b  ed ci g a e , c i li g he a e  b dge . C e e l , he a e 
had surplus workers, land, and political capital to undertake more projects (Gilmore 1999, 174, 
178). Moreover, the successes of the Civil Rights Movement threatened to destabilize the racial 
hierarchy. Southern farmers, meanwhile, wanted to sell their abandoned land, but there were few 
buyers. The state solved all three problems by replacing military projects with prisons. It realized 
its full capacity, employed hundreds of thousands, and tore black people from their communities 
while farmers sold their land at a premium. Because she applies a Marxist lens, Gilmore privileges 
he a e ial e la a i , a g i g ha  he ec  lie  a  he ba e f he i  e  
(Gilmore 1999, 178).  
Some scholars, however, have weakened the connection between the economy and prison 
construction. Hagan and coauthors, for instance, dispute the connection between abandoned 
farmland and prison siting. They point out that acres taken out of production did not predict a 
siting as farmers removed acreage across the state, not just the Southland where prison 
construction occurred. And while the average county lost 9.8% of farmland from 1982 to 1987, 
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prison counties only lost 5.3%. Moreover, their data demonstrates that the prison boom outlasted 
the farming crisis, weakening the connection even more. From 1978 to 1997, they find that 
cropland decreased by 3.9% in prison counties and 5.6 % in others  a vast decrease from the 
5.3% and 9.8% of the previous decade (Hagan et al 2015, 96 97). Gil e  a al i  che -picks 
one siting battle  a case study that this paper will demonstrate was outside of the norm. 
Thi  a e  a g e  ha , c a   Gil e  clai , li ic  lies at the base of the prison 
system. Even if one accepts the economic link, the economy only mattered in that it exacerbated 
an ongoing anti-black political moment. The prison boom emerged from a tough-on-crime 
movement  one that was necessarily anti-black. Anti-blackness has always featured the myth of 
black criminality. Planters invented the racial trope to cast the slave system as beneficial to both 
slaves and their masters. The white people who wrote the first fugitive slave narratives, for 
instance, always ended with the former slave expressing remorse for their escape. Without their 
hi e a ia ch , he  l g[ed] i  he cha  f hei   elfi h a e i e  (A d e  a d 
Mason 2008, 7). When abolition threatened black subjugation, white supremacists once again 
used the logic of black criminality to rationalize black codes and vagrancy laws. As one 
Philadel hia e a e   i , he la  e e ece a   kee  la e  f  b de [i g] cie  
(Anderson 2017, 20). Though free on paper, conceptions of black criminality allowed whites to 
ee abli h la e  b  a he  a e  (Black  2008). Thi  l g hi  ha  inextricably 
intertwined blackness and criminality.  
When the successes of the Civil Rights Movement again promised to bring about racial 
equality, Michelle Alexander highlights that racial conservatives once again employed the tool of 
black criminality to reassert white supremacy  this time, without using explicitly racial language. 
I  hi  e  le ic , c i i ali  a d  i  f  black e ,  a ki g Ji  C  e l i  i  
mass incarceration. Richard Nixon used this tough-on-crime rhetoric to transform the Republican 
Party by attracting economically and racially insecure Democrats (Anderson 2017, 102). He 
denigrated black culture rather than skin, but the result was the same: they restored the inferiority 
f he black a  a  he hi e a  fi ed a  (Bald i  1962). Thi  fea ge i g ked. In 
the early 1980s, a record number of Americans said they felt unsafe to walk alone in their 
neighborhood at night, thought there was more crime than the previous year, and had the least 
amount of confidence in the police to protect them (Gallup). The public  fea  a la ed i  
law-and-order policies, which quintupled the prison population from 350,000 in 1972 to over 
2,000,000 in 2012. While Nixon first declared the war on drugs, Reagan transformed his 
rhetorical devise into an actual war. He championed draconian mandatory minimum sentences 
for non-violent drug offenses, gave massive cash grants to police departments who prioritized the 
war on drugs, and provided police departments with a deluge of military equipment. He justified 
all this through an in e e edia ca aig  ha  c a ed he edia  c e  he c i e e ide ic.  
Sensationalized stories ensued, depicting dangerous drug-addicted black men. Though the 
h a i g had cha ged, c i i al  a d black  e ai ed  i  he A e ica  
consciousness (Alexander 2012, 6, 10, 74, 105).  
The e e d  k lace i  Calif ia, . Calif ia  la ge La i  la i , h gh, 
demands examining the intersection between anti-blackness and anti-Latinx sentiment. African 
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American media studies scholar Travis Dixon demonstrated that the L.A. local news was 2.5 times 
more likely to portray black felons and 1.9 times more likely to portray Latinx felons compared to 
white felons. In L.A., however, Latinx people accounted for 47% of felony arrests compared to 
25% for black people and 23% for white people. Moreover, even though black people committed 
25% f he c  fel ie , he  acc ed f  44% f fel   he l cal e . The e e e a  
true for Latinx and white people (Dixon, Linz 2000). The news ingrained the image of dangerous 
black and Latinx peoples but especially spotlighted black crime.    
Moreover, local polling data demonstrates that Californians were tougher on crime than the 
rest of the country. In 1981 poll, for instance, 91% of Californians said that criminal danger was 
higher than a year ago compared to 54% of the national population (U.C. Field Poll 1981). 
Moreover, 90% of respondents disagreed that the crime problem was overstated (U.C. Field Poll 
1981). They isolated the city as the driver of this crime wave as demonstrated by the 69% of polled 
Californians who thought crime was higher in the city  a  ad i i  ha  a alleled he edia  
portrayal of crime as an urban, black problem (U.C. Field Poll 1982). 
The lace  a i de a d c ime meant that in the 1982 gubernatorial election, George 
De k ejia  e e ed fe ile li ical il a  he a  agai  L.A.  fi  black a , T  B adle . 
De k ejia  e l i ed hi  e  ace f  li ical gai . He e e  had  fi e e f hi   
campaign staff for insinuating that Deukmejian would win because his opponent was black. 
Deukmejian attacked Bradley in colorblind language, too, spotlighting his criticism of police who 
h  a ed black e . De k ejia  ca  hi  c ce  a  a i- lice  a d f   c i e.  I  
he e d, hi  affe  hec  a e iali ed: De k ejia   b  a a gi  f le  ha  1% (Hagan 
et al. 2015). Polling from three years later, reveals that 1-2% of respondents said they disliked 
Bradley because he was black (U.C. Polling 1985). He ce, ch la  a ib e B adle  l   he 
B adle  effec : e  ef al  e f  a black a  (Haga  e  al. 2015).  
De k ejia  c ded aci  a la ed i  aci  licie . The Calif ia  legi la e explicitly 
demarcated the change when it, for the first time, stipulated that P i h e  f  c i i al 
beha i  i  he i a  e f i ca ce a i  (R la d 1988, 25). Thi  e  a i de 
precipitated harsher laws that reclassified misdemeanors as felonies, causing the prison 
population to more than triple in ten years.  
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Figure 2: California prison population from 1978 to 1987. The dashed line from 
1988 to 1993 shows the projected prison population based on the five-year 
master plan. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/113034NCJRS 
Consequently, prisons were at 120-330% capacity throughout the decade with the average 
system-wide overcrowding resting at 176% in 1987. The prison infrastructure could not keep pace. 
Health services, for example, hovered at 300% capacity. The state needed the new beds to 
acc da e i c ea e  i  he i a e la i .  Though Eason tried to decouple prison 
construction from prison populations, in California, the magnitude of the increase necessitated 
prisons as the destitute conditions caused prisoners to riot and assault guards (Rowland 1988, 28, 
40). 
The e c di g c i i  led  h ee fea e  f he a e  PIYBYi . Fi , he a e a g ed 
that they had to build the prisons to avoid a crisis. Opposing prisons was politically costly, too, as 
anti-prison legislators were labeled soft-on-c i e, h ge i i g li icia  i i . I  he 
c e  f hi  a e , he , he a e  e e e  b h he g e  a d he legi la e a  i all  
no legislators who did not represent prison communities opposed prison construction. Second, 
the state needed to build the prisons as quickly as possible, so they sought sites that reduced 
transport costs and offered community acceptance. These two goals quickly conflicted, though, as 
the ideal urban areas resisted the most. The state tried to solve the conflict by siting the prisons 
in predominantly Latinx areas because the Latinx communities lacked the political power to 
resist. Lastly, the state also chose how to convince a community to accept a prison, leading to the 
third pillar of PIYBYism: the state spoke of prisons as burdens in urban settings and boons in 
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al e . Thi  di c e a c  eflec  he lace  ie  f c i e a  a  ba , -white problem. 
In the name of fairness, prison proponents argued, the urban, Latinx communities had to house 
the scum they created. In rural areas, they changed rhetorical strategies, painting prisons as 
invisible economic engines. The contradictory strategies demonstrate that the state did not care 
about how the prison affected the community, only that the community would accept it.  
T  he a e  di a ,  c i ie  ehe e l  ed i  c c i  f   
reasons: fears of community corruption and political exploitation. Communities viewed criminals 
as toxic waste and wanted prisons far away from population centers as a result. The second fear 
eflec ed a e e f e le e   e i  he l adi g f he a e  cie  ill . All 
communities desired to feel empowered during the siting process. If neglected, these resentments 
culminated into impassioned opposition  an attempt to reclaim agency. Crucially, though, the 
second tenant depends on the first because communities only felt exploited because they viewed 
the prisoners as waste. In two of the counties, PIMBY coalitions emerged. Although they seemed 
to move past their anti-blackness, they merely channeled it into different forms. Eason argues 
ha  PIMBY g  edica ed hei  a g e   he i  ec ic i l , b  he 
overlooks that PIMBY groups also wanted to punish criminals. Prisons became symbols of law 
and order  of black subjugation. Anti-blackness, thus, never left PIMBY groups; it just took 
another form.   
LOS ANGELES COUNTY CAST STUDY (1982 – 1992) 
B  1982, he a e  i n population had increased by 30% in four years, causing the state to 
plan sites in Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Joaquin Counties (Wolinsky 1987). The move 
i f ia ed he al c i ie  a  he  a  he i i g  a  j  a he  e a le f ba  
reside  i g  d   he de e  (Ka la , Glad e 1991). Thei  e e e a i e  a h ed 
a bill that prohibited the new prisons from accepting prisoners until L.A. built theirs (Wolinsky 
1987). The  a ed L  A gele , he d ce  f Calif ia  c i e, to shoulder its share of the 
burden. The newly elected governor, George Deukmejian, concurred and sited the prison in East 
L.A., a ile ide B le Heigh , Calif ia  hi ic La i  ca i al.  
The a e  ca e f  he i i g i i iall  c ai ed a ke nel of a sensible argument, but as the 
political battle wore on and patience dwindled, the state revealed the punitive intention of the 
siting. The Los Angeles Times first mentioned the prison in an editorial that supported the site. 
They highlighted that 34% f he a e  i e  ca e f  L  A gele ,   ad ca e f  he 
i  a  a i h e , b   e ha i e he be efi  f ha i g a i  ea  he c i i al  h e . 
Longer distances from the city increased transport costs and meant that fewer families could visit. 
M e e , he a e de e a el  eed[ed] i  a  he e  e a ed a  151% ca aci  (Los 
Angeles Times 1985). The argument displayed two out of the three tenants of PIYBYism; they 
underscored the urgency of prison construction and the ideal nature of an urban site without 
parochially imposing the prison on the community.  
To the East L.A. community, the site was far from sensible. They pointed out that the area 
contained three county jails that housed more than 11,000 people within four miles (Olmo 1986). 
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A e bl a  Gl ia M li a cha ac e i ed i  i i g a  a  fai  cial b de ,  la e  
la e i g ha  Ea  L.A. a  bei g ade a d i g g d f  i e  (W li k  1986). A 
fea  f black e  de i ed he c i  fea  f i e ; he e f cial b de  
c e  he c i  a ie  f acce i g degenerate black criminals. In what would later 
become explicit, the Assemblywoman cast prisoners as toxic waste that, through some unnamed 
mechanism, would radiate into the community. The opposition later built their case, but their 
initial lack of rational arguments demonstrates that opposition arose from a place of fear, not fact. 
A  R be  Ca e , J ., a e be  f he a e  B a d f P i ,  i , he i i  fail[ed]  
e i  ha  [ he] ega i e  a e.  A  a e l , he c i  la e  a g e s represent post-
hoc justifications for what they instinctually opposed. 
Over the coming years, the opposition explained that prisons corrupted the community in two 
ways: prison escapes and corruption of their children. The Californian populace had very little 
fai h i  a i  abili   i la e i  i e  la gel  d e  Ke i  C e  1983 i  e ca e 
a d b e e  de  f f  e ide . The edia  a al f he c i e i ed he 
national trend of sensationalizing black deviance. The mother of one victim even complained that, 
he edia c i e   e a i ali e a ici  c i e  (Ca e  1985). The Times on its own 
dedicated hundreds of articles to the one crime.2 They referred to the incident either as a 
a ac e   a  A - de ,  de c i g he de a i  f Ke i  C e . The edia  fi a i  
on the one crime made prison escapes seem inevitable, propelling prison escapes to the top 
NIMBY c ce . O e Ea  L.A. he  la e ed, I  e ible. The e ill j  be a l  f e ca ed 
convic  The kid   be ec e la i g ide.  E e  h gh i  e ca e  e e e e el  
rare, the community envisioned an invasion of black criminals hellbent on inflicting pain on the 
community (Krier 1986). The state, according to the opposition, had to remove prisoners from 
society to end the terror. Even if the prisoners did not escape, though, they argued that their very 
e e ce da aged he c i . A  i i  leade  Be a Saa ed a gge ed, Child e  
need role models and different things to c ide  i  hei  eighb h d be ide  a i  
(Wolinsky 1986). The prison itself would corrupt children. They never explained, however, how 
child e  e e  i e  eci i a ed hei  b e e  d i g. The i e  e e  
morally debased that their mere existence corrupted society. Thus, the same force that led to mass 
incarceration produced mass opposition to prison sitings.  
In 1986, the Californian Assembly disregarded the opposition and overwhelmingly backed the 
East L.A. prison siting. Thei  j ifica i  f  he deci i  highligh  he a e  e e f c i i . The 
chai  f he A e bl  P blic Safe  C i ee a ed, The e i   ch hi g a  a e fec  i e f  
a i   he e ill al a  be a b a ial be  f e le h  e he l ca i .  
La ake  belie ed ha  if he  li e ed  e e  c i  c ce , he  ld e e  b ild 
prisons. This inaction was unthinkable because, as Democratic Assemblyman Richard Katz 
e lai ed, Y  ca  be gh  c i e if    he i e  a a .  The a i-black 
political climate pushed the state to adopt tough-on-crime policies, but the state failed to build 
e gh i   acc da e he ge i  i e . O e c i  i i  aled i  
comparison to the logistical and political nightmare of arresting criminals without the ability to 
take them off the streets (Wolinsky 1986). 
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The A e bl  e i f ia ed he Ea  L.A. c i , h  fel  ha  he e i e c i  
ed [i ]  (W li k  1986). The c i  e le ess in the face of the Assembly 
e ked bi e  e ie  f a  ba  e e al  he , i  he 1950 , L.A. de k ha a d  
projects in East L.A. to bring prosperity to white communities. City planners of the time viewed 
cities as living organisms, which were diseased by communities of color. As a result, cities 
nationwide used projects as a pretext to decimate communities of color (Rothstein 2017). L.A. city 
planners, for example, dissected East L.A. with five highways and cleared Latinx housing to make 
a  f  high i e  (Ol  1986). The c i  lack f li ical e  f ced he   a ch 
helplessly as the government displaced over 10,000 people and polluted their community 
(Sahagun 1989). The East L.A. community drew many parallels to the 1950s during the siting 
ce . The  ie ed he a da ed hea i g  a d e i e al e  a  he a e  a e   
mollify concerns without changing their behavior. They accused the state of downplaying its 
interest in the site to hinder the community from mobilizing sooner (Salazar 1985). The state did, 
in fact, change the site from a reception center to an actual prison late in the process (Boyer and 
Hernandez 1986). Furthermore, the state designated L.A. as the only site that did not require a 
full environmental report (Wolinsky 1987). Their desire to build prisons as quickly as possible 
painted prison construction as another form of the environmental racism that the community 
experienced in the 1950s.  
This feeling of helplessness evoked visceral reactions. Michael Woo, a city councilman, argued 
ha  he a e a  icki g  a l -i c e a ea  (B e  a d He a de  1986). A e bl a  
J e h M a ha e ed W  la g age, calli g he i i g li ical a e  (W li k  1986). 
The invocation of rape highlights their acute sense of powerlessness. Former opponents of the 
site, including Richard Polanco, an Assemblyman representing East L.A., voted for the prison 
(Boyer and Hernandez 1986). Democratic Assemblymen explained that these reversals 
e e e ed li ical eali ie  a d ha  he De c a  [did]  a   be i  he i i  f 
i g  h ld [ i  c c i ]  (W li k  1986). P la c  e e al l  heigh e ed he 
perception of their second-class citizenship; even their own representatives abandoned their 
i e e . The c i  a ge  a  P la c  a  al able. O e Ea  L.A. c llege de  e e  
decla ed ha  Wha  P la c  ha  d e  hi  c i  i  all  f gi able. I d ch a he  
f gi e a a i  (B e  a d He a de  1986). The fac  ha  hi  li ical a e  c ld eigh 
actual rape in the mind of this student encapsulates the intensity of the East L.A. opposition. 
P la c  e fec l  b li ed he c i  f a i . E e  he e e e a i e f  h  
many explicitly voted because he opposed the prison had acquiesced to the state. There was no 
winning; politicians always said one thing and did another. Politics acted as a rationalizing façade 
that allowed the state to oppress East L.A. This rage translated into intense mobilization. As Lucy 
Ra , a ke e  f  a  i i  g , e lai ed, I  he ld da  if he g e e  
aid M e  e le ed . I   ha  a  a e. The e i  a li i   h  ch j k 
he  ca  d   a c i  (1989). The c i  a  he prison siting as a continuation 
of a decades-long struggle, one they could now win.  
 A month later, they did just that. After applying intense pressure, the community 
compelled their representatives in the Assembly to use a parliamentary procedure that rendered 
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the now fifty-four pro-prison votes useless (Wolinsky 1986). As the state faced more setbacks, 
hei  he ic g e  i i lic. The   ea i ed he fac  ha  38% f he a e  c ic  hailed 
from L.A. to imply that the East L.A. community had to accept the prisoners they produced. 
Governor Deukmejian highlighted the issue in his 1987 State of the State address. To rapturous 
a la e, he decla ed, Thi -eight percent of state prison inmates come from Los Angeles, and 
yet the county has no state i . I  he a e f fai e , i  i  i e  cha ge ha  fac  
(Deukmejian 1987). The state now emphasized the fairness, not the convenience, of the site. He 
f he ed ha  he  c ld  dela  beca e he a e eeded   e da ge  c i i al  
behi d ba  a d elie e he e c d[i g]  (De k ejia  1987). 
I  hi  a , he a e illai i ed he Ea  L.A. c i   j if  he c i  
exploitation. Chicano scholar Rodolfo Acuna wrote that the state portrayed the community as 
ga g-infested a d l  la ed b  illegal alie  (Ac a 1989). Da  Wal e , a i  
advocate working for The Times, e e lified Ac a  b e a i , a g i g ha  he a e h ld 
f ce L.A.  ake e ibili  f  he i a e  i  d ce  i  ch ab da ce  (Walters 1990). 
The i  ha  a c i  ca  d ce  c i e eak   he e cei ed c l al  acial 
degeneracy of Latinx people. According to those like Walters, even those in East L.A. who did not 
commit a crime contributed to the crime wave by foste i g a de ia  c l e. The c i  
ef al     he c i e he  d ced a  f he  f f he c i  dege e ac .   
The Times f he  de i ed he c i  i h a bi a e edi ial i led J ble  T ke  
Punished by Delay in Prison O e i g.  I  f ll ed Da  Ga cia, a Vie a  a  e e a  a d Ea  
L.A. e ide , highligh i g hi  ai  d e  he c i  e i a ce. The a h , B b Bake , 
e ea edl  cha ac e i ed Ga cia a  a la a .  I  d a a ic e, Bake  e lai ed ha  Ga cia  
great-great-great-g a dfa he  ch ice  e e i  he Ci il Wa  i i ed hi  a i ic fe .  He 
a a ed Ga cia  b i g de i e  be a c  a d hi  di a i e  he  he di c e ed he a  
too short to serve. Then, he applied to become a prison guard and got accepted. The only problem? 
The i  figh  dela ed hi  e l e , aki g he la a  ffe  hile he c i  
e i ed. Thei  ggle did  e e e  hi  belief  a  e e h  i  a  dee l  ed  Ea  
L.A. a  a e.  The acc t contains insidious undertones. It valorizes law and order, 
ei f ci g he eed  f he a e  e e e le f c l  f  hei  c i ie . B  
extension, then, Baker labeled the East L.A. residents as pro-crime. The narrative attempts to 
elicit sympathy for a small portion of East L.A. by spotlighting a pro-prison Latino, one of the 
g d e .  De ig a i g he La i  c i , h , beca e a c e -prison strategy (Baker 
1987). 
The a e  de e a i   b ild he Ea  L.A. i  bega   eigh their anger because the 
1982 law meant that two already built prisons would go unused until East L.A. complied 
(W li k  1987). C e e l , i  1987, i  ad ca e  a ed a  e al ai  bill ha  
mandated a prison in Republican Lancaster in addition to Democratic East L.A (Wolinsky 1987). 
The la  e e e ed he a e  a e   ea e e ce i  f li ical e l i a i  b  
de a i g ha  he i i g ce  a   e al. The la g age f e al ai  e eal  ha  
lawmakers saw prisons as evils to remove a greater evil from the streets. Someone had to shoulder 
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the burden. The producers of this evil were the natural first choice, but the political reality forced 
Republicans to burden their own constituents.  
Perplexingly, though, pro-prison advocates sometimes spoke of prisons as economically 
be eficial. I  hi  edi ial i led H c i  a d Ill gic F  L.A,  Da  Wal e  e ca la ed hi  
 h c i  a d ill gic i hi   e e ce . He e, A  De k ejia  i ed  i  
Ja a , A i  i  a  ec ic b   he ec   B  ega dle  i  i  a a e  f i le 
e i  ha  L  A gele  h e  i  fai  ha e f i a e  i  d ce  i  ch ab da ce  (Wal e  
1990). The crime-producing community had to enjoy the benefits of the crime they produced? 
The a e  e b ace f b h i i e a d ega i e c ce i  f i  de a e  ha  he  
did not care about the effect of the prison. They only wanted to build prisons, causing them to try 
different strategies until one worked. In the end, no strategy could mollify East L.A. In 1992, 
Wilson allowed the Lancaster prison to open without East L.A.  
The hi  f Ea  L.A. c adic  a d c fi  ch la  la  a a i e . The al 
demand model falls short because rural communities opposed prisons, and the state sited prisons 
in urban, not rural areas. It does, however, reveal the power that community officials wielded  
power with which Gilmore failed to engage. The urban siting also undermines Gilmore because 
he a g ed ha  he a e  end goal was to make use of surplus labor, land, and political capital. 
The East L.A. case study, however, demonstrates that the state was more reactionary. They 
expended political capital to force an urban community to accept a prison  a senseless pursuit if 
he e d g al a   e e ce  fa la d. Gil e a e  ha  Ea  L.A.  i i  ca ed 
La d e  f  he ag ic l al alle  [ ] [ ] a  i   l ad i ki g a e  
(Gilmore 1990). She contradicts herself as she highlights that the prison boom preceded economic 
concerns. And, as Hagan and his coauthors demonstrated, these economic arguments were not 
nearly as strong as Gilmore claimed. Moreover, the battle lasted ten ea , he li  ha e f he 
prison boom. If economic concerns dic a ed he i  b , he  h  did  he a e aba d  
the urban location over the course of the decade? In reality, politicians reacted to a mandate from 
voters to incarcerate more people. Political, not economic, motivations primarily drove the prison 
boom.  
The i i g ggle, h e e , c fi  Ale a de  he i . A i-blackness permeated the 
process as the East L.A. community feared black criminals, causing their potential presence to 
e ge de  a  i i . The c i  e ce i  f e i onmental racism presupposed 
the toxicity of black prisoners, complicating the question of environmental racism. When 
e a i i g he a e  le i  a  i ca ce a i , a  ha e c i ici ed Ale a de  f  e l ki g 
the connection between mass incarceration and Latinx people (Kilgore 2015). In the East L.A. 
siting battle, even though the community viewed themselves as separate from the crime wave, the 
PIYBYi  clea l  ie ed La i  e le a  a  f i . S e a  be e ed  a g e ha  he a e  
treatment of Latinx people points to a larger pattern of white supremacy rather than anti-
blackness, but one must recognize that race denotes a position of power, not skin color. After all, 
blackness has never been a concrete category; it has always shifted to meet the goals of the white 
supremacist state (Lowndes and HoSang 2019). In California, the state still followed the national 
anti-black movement to undercut the Civil Rights Movement, but they transposed a tool of anti-
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Hollenbeck 
 
Volume 17 Issue 1 Spring 2020             63 
 
blackness  the casting of a subjugated people as criminal  onto Latinx people. It racially 
targeted Boyle Heights and justified the decision by villainizing the community. Confusingly, 
though, they sometimes presented prisons as an economic boon. This contradiction further 
complicates the ques i  f e i e al aci  beca e like he 1950  ba  e e al, he 
actual effects of the prison were unclear. What is clear, however, is that the state attempted to 
build prisons quickly, leading them to site prisons in historically marginalized communities to 
circumvent the required processes. In all, anti-black laws ballooned the prison population, 
necessitating mass prison construction. To build prisons as quickly as possible, the state used 
anti-black categorizations of criminality to justify siting the prison in a historically Latinx 
community  evidence of political, not economic, concerns. 
RIVERSIDE CASE STUDY (1982 – 1986) 
The Ri e ide i i g  he a e  a al i  f Ea  L.A. a  he  ha e a  
similarities: they occurred contemporarily, the state sited the prison in a Chicano stronghold with 
a history of activism (Coachella), and the community vehemently resisted. But the Riverside 
County siting battle is also worth examining for all the reasons it differed: it occurred in a rural  
area, featured a PIMBY coalition, and revealed the opinions of farmers. A year after the 1982 
a da e, he a e a ed e ial i e  i  Bea  a d C achella (H lla d 1983). Bea  
immediate opposition made Coachella the frontrunner. The state approached Coachella much 
differently than East L.A., though. Unlike trying to convince the community to accept its vermin, 
he  ld he c i  ha  hei  fea  e e b  f ig a ce  (H lla d 1984). The a e e  
officials to local meetings to convince he blic f a i  ec ic be efi , i i g a $100 
million increase in payroll taxes and five hundred new jobs (Holland 1984). They also painted 
i  a  i i ible, i g  di el he blic  e ce i  f f e e  e ca e . R al i i g  
forced the state to adopt this approach because, as the polling demonstrates, Californians viewed 
the crimewave as an urban problem.  
The strategy convinced some like community member Frank Duran, who highlighted that 
C achella  e ide  had a  a e age i c e f $4,400 a d ha  i  j b  ld ai e ha  
fig e  (L e 1984).  D a , e f he fe  PIMBY ice , ied ec ic   i  . The 
aj i  f e le, h e e , de ided he a e  e ial be efi  (H lla d 1984). Thei  
NIMBYism mirrored Ea  L.A.  fea  f c i  c i  a d li ical e l i a i . Like 
he Ea  L.A. la i , C achella e ide  i ce a l  ci ed Ke i  C e  e ca e.3 When the 
prisoners inevitably escaped, the residents feared, they would have free reign to destroy the 
c i  beca e he i  a   cl e  aj  la i  ce e  (Desert Sun 1984). 
Like he Ea  L.A. c i , NIMBY a la ed i  N  i  A e  Back Ya d. I  fac , he 
NIMBY group suggested an abandoned mining town as an alternative. That way, if the prisoners 
e ca ed, he c i  ld  ha e   ab  he  i i g  i h  e le  a  a 
resident put it in a thinly veiled reference to racial mixing (Holland 1984).  
O e  f he i i g a g ed ha  hi  i i g  process happened even without escapes. 
The al l ca i  ea  ha  i e  fa ilie  ld el ca e. F e  ch l e i e de , 
B bb  D ke, efe ed  he ce  a  a  i fl  f a  de i able ele e  (H lla d 1984). 
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Nadine Radovicz, a member of a diffe e  i  c i , e lai ed, Tha  ha  ake  e 
he  e ... Le  face i . Tha  all   a g d c cle f life  (K ie  1986). Rad ic  
bluntness highlights that rural Latinx communities viewed urban, black people as degenerate. 
Thei  c cle f life  ade he black a  de ce  i  c i e i e i able, de i g he c i  
in the process. Anti-blackness, thus, caused NIMBY groups to fear both prisoners and their 
families.  
The NIMBY g  e lai ed Ea  L.A.  ag e i  f community corruption, introducing 
he ig a f bei g a i  .  B d  e lai ed ha  he ked i  J lie , Illi i , e f he 
 fa  i   i  he c . De i e J lie  he  a ac i , e le l  k e  i  
a  he e he i  i  (B d  1984). Ma  C achella e ide  e e ed hi  fea  f bec i g 
the prison town (Holland 1984). They viewed themselves as a tourist town, a conception that the 
i  ld e d. Pa icia La , he head f he i  i i , dec ied, If he e  a i  
a  he i , he da eli e  be i  C achella, i ll be Pal  S i g  (Desert Sun 1984). The 
e i  f Pal  S i g  highligh  he c  acial e i  a  he la gel  i e i hed, La i  
Coachella already felt insecure competing against rich, white Palm Springs. Being associated with 
dangerous black criminals would further discourage tourism.  Prisons, thus, affect how the world 
views a town and how a town views itself. Coachella resisted so fervently because their identity 
depended on it.  
Again, perceptions of political exploitation heightened this resistance. In Coachella, Latinx 
people accounted for the vast majority of the population, and it was the only town in the county 
with majority Latinx representation (Borders 1983). Like in East L.A., their leaders charged that 
the state treated white-led Beaumont differently than Coachella. State officials told Beaumont of 
the potential siting before Coachella, allowing Beaumont to pass a resolution against the siting 
months before Coachella knew (Holland 1983). Moreover, Coachella residents complained that 
the state failed to publicize their hearings (Love 1984). Just like the East L.A. opposition groups, 
they accused the state of merely going through the mandated motions. These feelings of 
e l i a i  e ace ba ed he c i  e i a ce. La  decla ed, The e ai i g f    
g   lee , a d he  h i g he i i  ill g  a a  (Desert Sun 1984). The state did not 
care about their interests, but the community knew that through fierce opposition, they could 
make them care.  
This distrust of the government reflected C achella  ce al le i  Ce a  Cha e  U i ed 
Farm Workers (UFW) resistance. From the 1960s onward, UFW clashed with the exploitative 
agribusiness protected by then-g e  R ald Reaga . Cha e  ed  he c i  
orientation towards the state, decla i g ha  UFW had   i  Reaga  (H l e  2010). The 
city hosted rallies and promoted UWF boycotts (Mahr 1988). These experiences not only 
e e ched he c i  di  f he g e e  b  al  e ge de ed cce f l 
mobilization strategies. They distributed the following petition, for example, and in one year, 
collected 21,000 signatures (Desert Sun 1984).   
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Figure 3: Petition to stop the prison, June 18, 1984. California Digital 
Newspaper Collection, Center for Bibliographic Studies and Research, University 
of California, Riverside. 
https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=DS19840616.2.82.3&srpos=1&e=-------en--20--1-
-txt-txIN-stop+the+prison+-------1. 
The petition demonstrates the power of the prison stigma. It never mentions any harms of the 
prison, only that the Coachella siting was likely and that two hundred prisoners will work outside 
the prison (Committee to Stop the Prison 1984). The petition evokes fears that the prison walls 
c ld  kee   he black i a i ; he  ld e ca e a d i   i h he . A  Ea  
suggested, the prison stigma caused towns to oppose prisons by default. Poverty, though, made 
rural areas care less about their fear of black people and more about their wallets. Although 
Coachella was largely destitute, its identity as a tourist-town caused them to view prisons as 
antithetical to their economic interests, and their anti-black ideology worked in tandem with their 
economic concerns as a result.  
In July of 1984, Blythe, a town of 7,000 people on the Arizona border, expressed interest in the 
prison. On the surface, the community presented a purely economic argument. City manager Dick 
Milk ich e lai ed ha  Bl he c ld e he ec ic i ac .  B  he PIMBY g  ie ed 
the prison as more than an economic engine; they viewed it as a monument to law and order. 
Milk ich e ded, Bl he a ac  a  de i able a ie  a d he  ld be le  likel  
 i i  i h a i  (L e 1984). While he NIMBY g  i  C achella h gh  he i  ld 
attract black people, the PIMBY group in Blythe thought it would repel them. Though Blythe 
officials privileged the economic argument, the fact that they channeled anti-blackness to support 
their argument highlights the power of the ideology.  
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Blythe forced the state to choose between siting the prison in the obstinate Coachella or much 
f he  f  Calif ia  c a al ci ie . Se a  P e le , a g idi g fig e i  he i  b , 
e lai ed ha  Bl he  e e e  ade he i  e e el  e e i e. M e e , he 
proxi i   he A i a b de  ea  ha  he i  ec ic i l  ld ickle i  he 
eighb i g a e. O  he he  ha d, he e lai ed, C ec i  ld ch efe   l ca e i  
in a community where they are wanted rather than where they have to figh  hei  a  i  (L e 
1984). A prolonged political battle would delay the construction of critically needed beds. In the 
end, they chose to site the prison in Blythe. In Riverside County, when the state explicitly 
considered both economic and political factors, it privileged the political ones.    
Gil e ld a g e ha  he deci i  eflec ed he fa e  de i i . She ld be g. 
The a e ch e i e  i h i e fa la d,  acc di g  S e e Q e e be , a il 
conservationist with the US. Department of Agriculture. The leaseholder of a site grew asparagus 
on the land, employing hundreds (Love 1984). The purchase of farmland was state-driven as the 
landowner sold it not because the land was no longer profitable, but because the state offered 
more profit. Moreover, farmers in Blythe created a NIMBY coalition called Stop the Prison 
C i ee. The  a g ed ha  he i  ld de le e he  d i dli g a e  l  a d 
waste productive farmland. At the same time, they reiterated past NIMBY grou  acial c ce , 
c e di g ha  he i  ld a ac  a  de i able ele e , ai e he c i e a e, ca e ff 
winter visitors, and destroy the rural, small-  a he e  (Los Angeles Times 1986). They 
attributed this process to the literal toxici  f i e  a  hei  icke  ig  ead, T da . A 
i . T . N clea  Wa e  (L e 1984). The ig  ake Ea  L.A.  i i a i  e lici . 
P i e  e e adi ac i e a d ld de  he id llic all-  a he e.  Like he he  
NIMBY groups, the Blythe farmers felt politically exploited. They were not residents of the city 
a d held  li ical e  a  a e l  (L e 1984). P e e  held a he  ig  ha  ead, S ld 
O  b  Ci  Hall,  e fec l  e ca la i g he  ide  f he NIMBY coin (Love 1984). Without 
political power, the farmers, whose district controlled the water, refused to sell it to the state 
(Hussar 1985). 
The move infuriated Californian officials because they were racing against the clock. Presley 
admitted that the si e a  fa  f  e fec  b  e i ded l ke  ha  he  had  l ca e i  
e he e  (L e 1984). He la e  cla ified ha  he a e h ed  ge  he i  a ed bef e 
summer  a i e he  e ial i  i  a e likel   cc ,  agai  de a ing that 
Calif ia  e c di g c i i  led  i  c c i  (H a  1985). The a e e ca e he 
fa e  a ic  b  i i g he i  ide f he fa e  j i dic i  i  a  aba d ed de e  
seventeen miles from Blythe (Ramirez 1986). The town fficial  celeb a ed, decla i g ha  a 
e ai a ce i  a  ha d f  he .  The i i g a ea ed NIMBY a i de , , beca e a  e 
c i  e be  i ed , E ca ee  ld babl  die i  he de e  bef e he  eached 
he  (Desert Sun 1986). That way, less mixing could occur. The siting enabled the state to 
build the prison and the local economy to grow while isolating prisoners from the town. 
The Ri e ide i i g ba le de c e  hi  a e  a al i  f Gil e a d Ea . Fi , i  
heavil  de i e  Gil e  he i . The i i ial i i g a   d c i e fa la d ha  he e e  
ill ed. The fi al i e did  ake aba d ed fa la d ff ag ic l al gia  ha d ; he  
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settled in the desert. In fact, the city officials clashed with the c i  ag ib i e , 
i g Haga  a i ical a al i . Sec d, i  c fi  Ea  a al f he e g h f 
local communities. In one county, three communities successfully expelled a prison. The power 
of a community to resist, however, d e   e a c i  e   de a d. The a e 
obviously wielded this power as they mandated the prisons before any PIMBYism ever existed. 
They explicitly wanted to build prisons to avoid the collapse of the prison system. Hence, the 
a e  PIYBYism stemmed from anti-black ideology, not any economic concerns. This anti-
black e  al  ked agai  he a e beca e he Calif ia  lace  a i-blackness led to 
extensive NIMBYism. Economic desperation allowed certain towns to overlook the fear of 
neighboring black criminals by channeling their anti-blackness into new forms. Examining the 
interaction between the state and the chosen community demonstrates that ideology, not 
economics, drove PIYBYism while ideology and economics clashed to determine he c i  
response.  
IMPERIAL COUNTY CASE STUDY (1986-1990)  
 The Imperial County siting reinforces the patterns of NIMBY-and-PIMBYism. This time, 
h e e , he a e k e  he ca e  f NIMBYi  a d ed he i  be efi   a  
economically depressed community with no tourism industry. They also stressed the pri  
isolation, assuaging any fears of black infiltration and instead, presented the prison as a way to 
punish black people. Like in Blythe, the town-dwelling communities supported the prison while 
the farmers opposed it. In Imperial County, however, two communities desired the prison  one 
white and one Latinx. The battle between the two PIMBY coalitions revealed that when politicians 
viewed a prison as a political favor, they diverted the supposed economic benefits to white 
communities. 
 The state initially selected the Mount Signal site, a stretch of land nestling the Mexican border 
near Calexico (Calexico Chronicle 1988). Due to Mexican immigration, the southern end of the 
county was disproportionately poor and Latinx. Unlike the previous two sites, Calexico had no 
history of Chicano activism, contributing to a more favorable view of the state. The Calexico 
Chronicle iced he c i   f he i e. Their articles demonstrate that, like in 
Ri e ide, ace lag ed he c  li ic  (S e ling 1989). Attitudes towards the site fell along 
racial lines with Latinx proponents and white opponents. The Latinx population formed the 
c ali i  d bbed J b , O i ie , B i e , S abili  (JOBS)  e ha i e he i  
economic stimulus while whites formed Southerners Totally Against Mount Signal (STAMP).  
In Imperial County, the state exploited their knowledge that economic desperation engendered 
PIMBYi . The  i ed ha , he ec ic be efi  [ f he i ] ld l  la ge.  The  
fomen ed fea  f f g i g ec ic i ie  b  highligh i g he  c ie  i habi a  
h  e e deligh ed  ell [ he ] all ab  he ad a age  b gh  b  he i  (Calexico 
Chronicle 1986). The committee asserted that a prison would revitalize the c  fl de i g 
economy. In a later hearing, the speaker, Sam Sharp elaborated that each prisoner came with a 
price- ag. Beca e he ce  ea  i e  a  e be  f he c i ,  he i e  
ld i fla e he c  la i , a la ing to a $300,000 annual tax break (Calexico 
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Chronicle 1988). The tax breaks, however, are a zero-sum game; by uprooting black men from 
their communities, they effectively transferred subsidies from black-urban spaces to rural ones. 
Moreover, they created rural prison jobs by removing black men from their urban employment. 
Accordingly, the potential benefits to Calexico represented a transfer of wealth from poor urban 
areas to poor rural ones. 
The e  a d hea i g al  add e ed he c i  fea  f black people. The researchers 
e l ed he ble  f i  fa ilie  h  el ca ed f  he ci , e lai i g ha  le  ha  
1% of families did so. In doing so, they attempted to mollify fears that new prison families would 
e  he elfa e a e,  a c mmon trope surrounding black families. The anxieties of changing 
demographics precipitated fears of declining safety. The report assuaged these concerns, finding 
ha  i  c i ie  ha e l e  c i e a e  ha  - i  c i ie .  The e ea che  
assured Imperial County that urban black families and prisoners would not infiltrate their 
community (Calexico Chronicle 1986). In the hearing, Sharp emphasized the invisibility of the 
i  hile al  a i f i g he c i  ge  i h c i i al . Responding to community 
concerns of parole release, Sharp emphasized that the prison staff escorted parolees to the bus 
station, after which they had a limited time to report back to their place of arrest. The prisoners 
ld ha e  i   i   i h he c i . He he  di c ed he i  
ec i  fea e , hich e ed he a ea  afe  a  he c  f i e  li elih d . The e  
protocols prohibited community-building activities, such as communal eating. They demeaned 
them by handcuffi g he  bef e le i g he  e i  hei  cell  a d b  c i i i g  he  i  he 
shower (Calexico Chronicle 1988). Overall, he underscored that the procedures created an 
i la ed ci i e  a  fa  a  he i e  i  c ce ed  (Calexico Chronicle 1988). The state knew 
ha  i  had  cha ge he c i  e e i  f a i-blackness. They wanted the town to view 
the prison as a place of inescapable punishment. The forum demonstrated that, though the 
c i  elc ed he i  ec ic i l , he  did not extend the hospitality to its 
prisoners. The community sought to bar the black people from their towns while reaping the 
ec ia  be efi  f he i la ed ci i e .  I  c fi  ha  he ba le be ee  NIMBY a d 
PIMBY attitudes was one between fears of anti-blackness and desire for economic vibrancy. It 
also suggests a top-down demand as the state felt compelled to print propaganda to convince the 
community.  
S he  hi e fa e  did  acce  he a e  ea i g. I ead, he  f ed STAMP to 
oppose the Mount Signal Site and support locating the prison in Calipatria, a town in the far 
Northern stretch of the county (Calexico Chronicle 1989). They waged their campaign through the 
Imperial Valley Press, which only archived volumes from 1998 onwards, meaning that all of the 
information in this paper comes through the biased Calexico Chronicle. Nevertheless, the 
blica i  e ce i  f STAMP highligh  he c flic  be ee  La i  a d hi e e le. The 
Chronicle almost exclusively referred to he e e  a  e e e i g a c le A gl  fa e ,  
only once revealing that the group had over a thousand members (Steppling 1989). In the 
C c e  elli g, he e fa e  l  f ll ed hei  elf-i e e  a d he ei de  ea ,  
such as that the i  ld a  [ hei ] ie  f he e  (Lega i 1989). I  la e  i e , he  
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elab a ed  STAMP  b g  a g e , ch a  fa  la d l , hea  e f ee , [a d] 
c ge i  (Calexico Chronicle 1989). 
In the likeliest case, the farmers knew that the prison would not benefit them because they had 
no need for prison work and would not have enjoyed increased sales. Instead, the prison would 
waste precious resources. By advocating for the prison siting in Calipatria, they could enrich the 
county through tax breaks and the increased taxable income while avoiding the prison stigma.  
 
Figure 4: Advertisement paid for by JOBS in the Calexico Chronicle, April 13, 
1989. California Digital Newspaper Collection, Center for Bibliographic Studies 
and Research, University of California, Riverside. 
https://cdnc.ucr.edu/?a=d&d=CC19890406.2.29.2&srpos 
The vast majority of the southern population, however, desperately needed jobs. They viewed 
STAMPS  e e  a  a be a al f hei  egi   be efi  he c  hi e  a  he c  f i  
Latinx population. 
STAMP  e e  led  he c ea i  f Cale ic  JOBS, hich celeb a ed he i  
economic benefits while denigrating criminals (Calexico Chronicle 1989). In an advertisement 
displayed in l i le i e , he c ali i  decla ed ha  O l  e g  f e le ill be 
ad e el  affec ed  b  he M  Sig al P i   AND THEY RE ALL CRIMINALS  (JOBS 1989). 
It then listed all of the economic vitality that the prison would bring.   
JOBS appropria ed STAMP  la g age f ad e el  i ac ed,   l   a age c ce  
f he i  e e ce, b  al   highligh  he ha  ha  ld c e  i e . 
Consequently, JOBS itself explicitly viewed the economic prosperity of the area at the expense of 
prisoners. The group muddles common narrative that authors such as Gilmore present; Latinx 
communities, too, coveted the benefits of prison construction. In this way, the driving force 
behind prison proliferation was anti-black attitudes, not just pro-white ones. 
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 The Chronicle e e ed ha  he he  c  ec ic de e a i  j ified he M  
Signal site. John Steppling, the editor of the publication, elli gl  de c ibed he a ea a   
Bagdad,  efe e ci g a  aba d ed   hei  h. Councilman Victor Legaspi concurred, 
i i g ha  e e e k e  he S he  e d f he c  a   a d de e ed  (Lega i 
1989). The Southern coalition viewed the prison as their only path to prosperity because, as the 
c cil a  e lai ed, e l i a i  f  S he  eighb  c  age  f  l cal ci i e . 
Prisons, however, could not hire undocumented workers. Legaspi concluded that the prison 
ld ca e he ec  f he h le c   g  e e d l  (Lega i 1989). T  he , 
prison siting reflected the need of the surrounding area. In this way, the Southern county treated 
prisons as any other public works project. Unlike infrastructure investment, however, the profits 
that JOBS sought necessitated black suffering. Prison construction, then, represented the rural 
c ie  a e   alle ia e hei  ffe i g b  e ace ba i g he ffe i g f ba , black 
communities.     
In the end, the state selected the Calipatria site, promising a second prison at the Mount Signal 
within the year. In a iece i led SUE SUE SUE  ba le c  f  Cale ic ,  he Chronicle 
excoriated the decision, disclosing that JOBS intended to sue the Chamber of Commerce, the State 
of California, the CDC, and STAMP for acting without authority. The desperate move reflected the 
 c llec i e e e f i dig a i  d e  he fac  ha  he Cali a ia i i g ld ca e he 
economic benefits to leak to nearby counties (Calexico Chronicle 1989). The Chronicle blamed 
the change of heart on their lack of political sway and financial backing, demonstrating that they 
viewed prisons as a political favor to spur economic growth. The director of the CDC, James 
R la d, a ib ed he cha ge  STAMP  e e  pressure that Calexico believed reflected 
the size of their checkbooks, not their movement. Victor Legaspi concurred and lamented that 
he l e  i  hi  ca e a e  l  S he d, b  al , i eg i .  He c i ed a d icall , 
H  ad ha  h d ed  f h a d  f d lla  e e e  a d  he elec i  f he be  site 
 l   ha e he  e ege  hei  fi di g . (Oh ell, i  l  a a e  e !)  (Lega i 
1989). Edi  S e li g f he ed, ch i  life i  he big ci  f Sac a e ,  all di g  he 
political clout of agribusiness in California and the political representation of the northern part of 
the county. To add insult to injury, the CDC reneged on their promise to site the second prison at 
M  Sig al, leadi g S e li g  e clai , I  i  bla a l  a e l  f i fl e ce a d 
accommodation to the power c e  (S e li g 1990). F  ea  f h e c l i a ed i  
hi g. Af e  hi i g a ecial l bb i  a d ei b i g all f CDC fficial  la e a d h el c , 
the town felt used (Calexico Chronicle 1990). 
The Imperial County siting encapsulates key themes of this paper. It cements that, contrary to 
Gil e  he i , he ag ib i e  f e  ed he i  b . A i-blackness elicited 
Cale ic  fea  f black ig a i  a d hei  ie  f he i  a  a i i e i i i . O l  he  
communities combined anti-blackness with economic desperation did PIMBY groups emerge. 
R al de a d f  i  e e ed la e i  he i  b , de i i g Ea  a g e . O l  
in Imperial County did sections within the county fight for placement near their neighborhoods. 
Here, politicians were happy to provide for their constituents as they enabled tough-on-crime 
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licie . Race fac ed i  he a a i e agai  a  li icia  e l ked he La i  c i  
desires, instead capitulating to the will of white constituents.  
CONCLUSION 
By examining how the state and community communicated, this paper has challenged 
economic-ba ed e la a i  f  he i  b . Gil e  he i  e lai  e f he h ee 
examined siting battles. The state tried to site prisons in urban areas, but when it begrudgingly 
turned to rural ones, agribusiness heavily resisted. The a e  c i i  a  i a il  li ical,  
economic. Though Eason correctly highlights that economic desperation drove rural demand, this 
happened much later in the California prison boom and only after the state propagandized the 
i  be efi . M e e , he illi gl  e l k  al aci  a d hei  e f la -and-order 
rhetoric.  
Anti-blackness underpins PIYBY, NIMBY, a d PIMBY c ali i . The a e  PIYBYi  
e ea edl  i ked a eed   e e c i i al  f  he ee   figh  c i i al e .  I  
reality, the state used prisons to curb black advancement, exploding the prison population far 
beyond capacity. The state privileged ideological, not economic, concerns. This anti-black 
ide l g  e ed ha  fe  a ed hi  e  i  hei  back a d. NIMBY c ali i , , ie ed 
prisons as brimming with black filth. The constant allusions to pollution, trash, ills, and nuclear 
waste demonstrate that anti-blackness was the basis of NIMBYism. On the surface, PIMBY 
coalitions seem to escape the pull of anti-blackness as they lobbied for economic benefits, but they 
intertwined economic benefits with black subjugation.  
These economic benefits did not materialize. Last year, The Desert Sun published a story about 
Bl he, a ki g Ca  a ij a a a e hi  'd i g'   he Calif ia-A i a b de ?  
(DiPierro, 2018). Unlike what the city officials thought in the 1980s, a renaissance was not at hand 
for Blythe. The town still struggles because the state used the prison to fix a political, not an 
ec ic, ble . Bl he  ea ch f  a i acle eli i  ha   b gh  he   a ij a a, 
ea i g ha  a  f he  five thousand inmates do time for a now legal crime  one that 
the surrounding community uses to soothe their economic woes. In the 1980s, Blythe listened to 
the state and accepted thousands of prisoners for profit. Now, the town will profit off the plant 
that put many of the prisoners there in the first place. In perhaps the best suiting metaphor, black 
men convicted of minor drug possession will be surrounded by fields of marijuana growing in the 
desert to fix a problem that the prison could not. 
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NOTES
 
1 All sources found through California Digital Newspaper Collection and the L.A. Times Archive. 
2 See https://search.proquest.com/hnplatimes/results/96C6CB6FC5A14D6EPQ/2?accountid=14698#scrollTo for 
endless coverage of the Chino Incident.   
3 See: Ca l L e, C achella c cil e  a e i  i i g al,  Desert Sun, June 20, 1984; H lla d, F  
ible i  i e ; L e, T  f  i  hea i g.  
 
 
